This article examines the following case. A set of countries produce goods from labor, government input and natural resources. Because the conservation of natural resources in any country yields utility (e.g. through biodiversity) in every country, and because there is no benevolent international government, a resident of the countries is chosen as the regulator to whom conservation policy is delegated. The countries influence the regulator by their political contributions. In this common agency setup, the following result is proven: as long as the minimum conservation standards are implemented, conservation subsidies are welfare decreasing, involving excessive conservation. This suggests that there should be no "co-financing" for designated conservation sites in the EU NATURA 2000 project.
Introduction
This article considers the case where the management of the conservation of environment must be delegated to a potentially self-interested regulator.
The research question is then the following: Are regulatory standards sufficient, or should subsidies as well be used in conservation?
This article is motivated by the following experience. In the the European Union (EU), the European Commission (EC) regulates the conservation of biodiversity by two directives (cf. Ostermann 1998):
• Birds Directive 79/409/EEC establishes a network of designated sites called Special Protection Areas (SPAS) for wild birds.
• Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC establishes a network of designated sites called Special Areas of Conservation (SACS) for the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora.
These two directives contain annexes where habitats and species are listed as being of Community interest. The NATURA 2000 network consist of both SPAS and SACS sites. A Member State is obliged to guarantee a "Favorable Conservation Status" to every NATURA 2000 site. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in the political structure of the EU. For instance, according to Weber and Christophersen (2002) , the forest-owner associations (CEPF and BNFF) and the environmental NGOs (WWF and Fern) perform political influence on implementing the Habitats Directive.
There has been three reasons for why EU policy has traditionally relied on direct regulation rather than on financial measures: (i) Until 1987, EU environmental policy lacked a proper legal basis. It had to rely only on the "implied powers" of Article 235 of the 1957 Rome Treaty, which stipulated the use of directives (Ledoux et al. 2000) .
(ii) With the ratification of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU could adopt eco-taxes and other fiscal measures only with the unanimous agreement of all states (Jordan 1998 ). This caused a threshold for ecological tax reforms and a continuing institutional inducement to rely on regulation.
(iii) Because the founding Member States vested the EU only with a little financial resources, from the viewpoint of the Commission, regulation had the benefit of being paid for by private actors in the Member States rather than the EU itself (Majone 1996) .
Would it be useful to extend the authority of the Commission beyond direct regulation? There has been political pressure towards the co-financing of the regulatory sites through the budget of the Commission. Swanson (1994) , Barbier and Schulz (1997) and Endres and Radke (1999) consider the optimal area of a habitat when the variety of species yields utility, comparing the benefits of maintaining the habitat with those of using land in production. Barrett (1994) , Swanson (1996) , Sarr et al. (2008) , Gatti et al. (2011) examine biodiversity management in a world where some countries (called the "South") are highly endowed with biodiversity, while the others (called the "North") are the primary location of the research and development industries relying upon these resources. In that case, the problem is how developing countries should be compensated for the "incremental costs"of biodiversity conservation. Because I focus on the case of the Euro-pean Union (EU), I rather work with a model where every country is endowed with biodiversity that enhances welfare for the inhabitants of all countries.
The problem is then how the common policy should be organized, given that the policy makers are potentially self-interested. Winands et al. (2013) consider how the heterogeneity of countries with respect to ecosystems and wealth influences the stability of international agreements on biodiversity conservation. They model a coalition formation game and obtain following results. In the absence of inter-country transfers, heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth reduces the size of a stable coalition, but with optimal transfers, even large coalitions can be stable. In contrast to Winands et al. (2013) , I consider the case where countries lobby the regulator that manages conservation, but where any individual country can refuse from conservation at a fixed cost. The problem is then to find out the optimal set of tools for the regulator. 
The economy
There is a large number M of countries i ∈ [0, M] and a number J i ∈ N of residents in each country i. The total mass of the residents is J .
Production
All countries i ∈ [0, M] supply the same good, which I choose as the numeraire in the model. In country i, exogenous labor supply L i is allocated between production l i and public services z i and exogenous natural resources N i between production n i and conservation b i :
The representative firm in country i produces output y i from labor l i , natural resources n i and public services z i according to the thrice differentiable and strictly concave function
where the subscripts l, n or z denote partial derivatives of f i with respect to
Externality through natural resources
All residents in the countries i ∈ [0, M] benefit from the conserved re-
where b . 
Utility
To eliminate aggregation problems and distributional concerns from the model, I assume that all residents j ∈ [0, J] have the same utility function
where I j is the income (= consumption) of resident j and u(b) the common utility of conservation [cf. (4)]. If utility U j were a non-linear function of income I j , then the distributional effects would excessively complicate the analysis. With the quasi-linear utility function (5) and the definitions (3) and (4), it is easy to aggregate utilities as follows. (4) and (5)]
Because the average number of residents per country,
, is strictly positive, the marginal utility of conservation b i in country i,
, is strictly positive.
Second, the representative resident of country i ∈ [0, M] derives utility from conserved resources b and aggregate revenue in that country,
according to [cf. (4) and (5)]
Because there is a large number M of countries, the marginal utility of con-
Thus, the local government in country i (hereafter called country i) ignores its effect on the conserved resources b and maximizes total revenue in that country:
The regulator
One resident j ∈ [0, J] at a time is elected for some period as the regulator that runs conservation policy with the following country-specific tools. First, it sets the minimum amount m i of natural resources (hereafter called the regulatory standard ) that must be devoted to conservation [cf.
(1)]:
Second, the regulator can provide "co-financing" for protected sites (cf. Art.
8, Directive 92/43/EEC). This is an ad valorem subsidy s i to natural resources being used for conservation over and above the regulatory standard, 
where α is a constant. If the utility function of the regulator, W , were nonlinear in its arguments u(b) and U, then the distributional effects of political contributions R i would excessively complicate the analysis.
Pareto optimum
To derive the Pareto optimum for the countries, let's assume that there were no regulator and that the representative household could directly maximize its utility (6) by the conserved resources b .
}, subject to the condition that the sum of the
(1) and (2)] is consumed:
This leads to the Pareto optimality conditions [cf. (2) and (11)]
Production efficiency f 
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and natural resources must be the same in utility and production.
Countries
The political economy of conservation is an extensive form game with 
Firms
Firms use natural resources n i up to the level at which the rent r i for these is equal to the marginal product of these,
The subsidy base in country i, V i , is then equal to the rent r i times conserved resources over and above the regulatory standard, b i − m i , in that country.
Noting (1) and (2), I define that base as the following function:
Local governments
To finance the subsidies s i , the regulator is allowed to collect a uniform tax t from all countries. To keep taxation non-distorting, let t be the tax on given labor supply L i . Noting (1), (2) and (13), one obtains revenue in country i, (8), as follows:
where y i is output, s i the subsidy for the subsidy base V i [cf. (13) (14) subject to the regulatory constraint (9), given the tax t. Given the definition (13), this maximization yields the equilibrium conditions (cf. the Appendix)
From (2) and (17) it follows that the regulatory constraint (9) is binding without a subsidy (i.e. with s i = 0):
Because the production function (2) is thrice differentiable, the subsidy base (13) is twice differentiable and the first-order conditions (16) and (17) define diffentiable response functions for country i (cf. the Appendix):
In other words, a small subsidy s i to conservation increases resources b i devoted to conservation in any country i ∈ [0, M].
The political equilibrium
To enable an equilibrium with lobbying, I assume the following: if country
is not involved in conservation management, then it is not subject to the regulatory constraint (9), it does not pay the tax t to the regulator, does not obtains the subsidy s i , but it pays a constant penalty ξ j > 0 to the other countries. In this outside option, the revenue of country i is [cf. (14)]
Given the definition (13) of the subsidy base and the response functions
where t 
Aggregate consumption c is equal to total revenues
Noting (15) and (23), this condition can be written in the form
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit et a. (1997) , I assume that each country i can credibly commit itself to its contribution function
With (23) and (24), the utility of the regulator (10) then becomes
Because there is a large number of countries i ∈ [0, M], country i ignores its effect on the tax rate t. It maximizes its net revenue Π i (m i , s i , t) [cf.
(15)] minus political contributions R i , given the tax rate t. The regulator maximizes its utility (25). According to Dixit et al. (1997) , a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a policy (m, s) and a set of contribution 
(c) The policy (m, s) maximizes the utility of the regulator: Given (15) and (18), the equilibrium conditions (26) are equivalent to
Conditions (28) say that in equilibrium the change in the contributions of country i, R i , due to a change in any instrument m i or s i equals the effect of that instrument on the revenue of that country, Π i . These contribution schedules are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to a globally truthful contribution schedule that represents the preferences of country i at all policy points as follows (cf. Dixit et al. 1997) :
where π i is the revenue of country i in case that country does not pay contributions, R i = 0, but the regulator chooses its best response, given the contribution schedules of the other countries k = i [cf. (21)].
Welfare considerations
With (15), (25) and (28), the equilibrium conditions of the regulator, (27), for the regulatory standards m are equivalent to
Furthermore, if the subsidies s are used, then the function (25) has the following partial derivatives [cf. (15) and (28)]:
Let's consider the initial position where there are no subsidies, with (16) , (19), (23), (28) and (30), the Pareto optimality conditions (12) hold true as follows:
On the other hand, from (6), (20), (23) and (31) it follows that the regulator is willing to increase subsidies s i above zero:
Thus, the Pareto optimum is not a stable equilibrium with subsidies. With (16), the subsidies s i > 0 violate production efficiency [cf. (12)]
and because 
Conclusions
In this article, I consider an international regulator that runs the conservation of environmental resources for a coalition of countries. Firms make goods from labor, natural resources and public services. The local governments produce public services and lobby the regulator, relating their prospective political contributions to the latter's decisions. The instruments of con-servation consist of regulatory standards, and potentially of the subsidies to conserved resources over and above those standards. The main findings are the following. Lobbying for regulatory standards alone leads to Pareto efficiency. The introduction of subsidies generate excessive conservation and distort the allocation of labor between the private and government sectors.
The analysis is based on four basic assumptions: (i) there are public inputs to production in the countries; (ii) the regulator has interests of its own and it is elected from the residents of the countries, (iii) the individual utility is linear in consumption, and (iv) revenue-raising taxation is non-distorting.
These assumptions can be justified as follows. (iv) According to Palokangas (2013) , distorting taxation for the payment of subsidies involves inefficiency, which strengthens the result of this article.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized game-theoretical model is used to derive results on conservation policy, the following conclusion is nevertheless justified. In the EU project NATURA 2000, the power to set regulatory standards is appropriate. If there is any reason to believe that the policy makers in the EU have interests of their own, "co-financing" alonside regulatory standards hampers welfare.
Finally, let's consider the case b i > m i . Then, λ = 0 holds by (35) and the second-order conditions are
